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Abstract
A cognitive wireless sensor network (CWSN) is an emerging technology with great potential to avoid traditional
wireless problems such as reliability. One of the major challenges CWSNs face today is security. A CWSN is a special
network which has many constraints compared to a traditional wireless network and many different features
compared to a traditional wireless sensor network. While security challenges have been widely tackled in traditional
networks, this is a novel area in CWSNs. This article discusses a wide variety of attacks on CWSNs, their taxonomy
and different security measures available to handle the attacks. Also, future challenges to be faced are proposed.
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1. Introduction
Global data traffic in telecommunications has an annual
growth rate of over 50%. While the growth in traffic is
stunning, both the rapid adoption of wireless technology
over the globe and its penetration through all layers of
society are even more amazing. Over the span of 20
years, wireless subscription has risen to 40% of the
world population, and is expected to grow to 70% by
2015. Overall mobile data traffic is expected to grow to
6.3 exabytes per month by 2015, a 26-fold increase over
2010 [1]. Over the recent years, wireless and mobile
communications have increasingly become popular with
consumers.
In regards to wireless networks, one of the fastest
growing sectors in recent years was undoubtedly that of
wireless sensor networks (WSNs). WSN consists of spa-
tially distributed autonomous sensors that monitor a
wide range of ambient conditions and cooperate to
share data across the network. WSNs are introduced
increasingly into our daily lives. Potential fields of appli-
cations can be found, ranging from the military to home
control through commercial or industrial, to name a
few. The emergence of new wireless technologies such
as Zigbee and IEEE 802.15.4 has allowed for the devel-
opment of interoperability of commercial products,
which is important for ensuring scalability and low cost.
Most WSN solutions operate in unlicensed frequency
bands. In general, they use ISM bands, like, the world-
wide available 2.4 GHz band. This band is also used by
a large number of popular wireless applications, for
example, those that work over Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. For
this reason, the unlicensed spectrum bands are becom-
ing overcrowded with the increasing use of WSN-based
systems. As a result, coexistence issues in unlicensed
bands have been subject of extensive research [2,3], and
in particular, it has been shown that IEEE 802.11 net-
works [4] can significantly degrade the performance of
Zigbee/802.15.4 networks when operating in overlapping
frequency bands [3].
The increasing demand for wireless communication
presents an efficient spectrum utilization challenge. To
address this challenge, cognitive radio (CR) has emerged
as the key technology, which enables opportunistic
access to the spectrum. A CR is an intelligent wireless
communication system that is aware of its surrounding
environment, and adapts its internal parameters to
achieve reliable and efficient communication [5].
The main different between traditional WSN and new
cognitive wireless sensor network (CWSN) paradigm is
that in CWSN nodes change their transmission and
reception parameters according to the radio environ-
ment. Cognitive capabilities are based in four technical
components: sensing spectrum monitoring, analysis and
environment characterization, optimization for the best
communication strategy based on different constrains
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(reliability, power consumption, security, etc.) and adap-
tation and collaboration strategy.
Adding those cognition capabilities to the existing
WSN infrastructure will bring about many benefits. In
fact, WSN is one of the areas with the highest demand
for cognitive networking. In WSN, node resources are
constrained mainly in terms of battery and computation
power but also in terms of spectrum availability.
Hence with cognitive capabilities, WSN could find a
free channel in the unlicensed band to transmit or
could find a free channel in the licensed band to com-
municate. CWSN could provide access not only to new
spectrum (rather than the worldwide available 2.4 GHz
band), but also to the spectrum with better propagation
characteristics. A channel decision of lower frequency
leads more advantages in a CWSN such us higher trans-
mission range, fewer sensor nodes required to cover a
specific area and lower energy consumption.
However, the cognitive technology will not only pro-
vide access to new spectrum but also provides better
propagation characteristics. By adaptively changing sys-
tem parameters like modulation schemes, transmit
power, carrier frequency and constellation size, a wide
variety of data rates can be achieved. This will certainly
improve power consumption, network life and reliability
in a WSN. Adding cognition to a WSN provides many
advantages.
This way, CWSN is a new concept proposed in litera-
ture [6] with the following advantages.
• Higher transmission range.
• Fewer sensor nodes required to cover a specific area.
• Better use of the spectrum
• Lower energy consumption.
• Better communication quality.
• Lower delays.
• Better data reliability.
Despite the research interest in CWSN, security aspects
have not yet been fully explored even though security will
likely play a key role in the long-term commercial viabi-
lity of the technology. The security paradigms are often
inherited from WSN and do not fit with the specifica-
tions of CR networks. Looking at the literature related to
CR, security researchers have seen that CR has special
characteristics. This make CR security an interesting
research field, since more chances are given to attackers
by CR technology compared to general wireless net-
works. However, at present there are no specific secure
protocols which integrate WSN and CR needs.
At this, still immature, point of CR, it is important to
understand some fundamental issues such as potential
threats, potential attacks and the consequences of these
attacks.
As [7] says, the CR nature of the system introduces an
entire new suite of threats and tactics that are not easily
mitigated. The three main characteristics of CR are envir-
onment awareness, learning and acting capacity. At first,
these characteristics should be an advantage against
attacks but they can become in weaknesses. For example,
CR nodes collaborate to make better decisions but these
communications are ways to propagate the attack in the
network.
Considering these characteristics since the attacker
point of view, the fundamental differences between a
traditional WSN and the CWSN network are
• The potential far reach and long-lasting nature of an
attack.
• The ability to have a profound effect on network
performance and behaviour through simple spectral
manipulation.
The information sensed in a CRN is used to construct a
perceived environment that will impact in a certain way
in current and future behaviour s of all the nodes in the
network. The induction of an incorrectly perceived envir-
onment will cause the wrong adaptation of the CRN,
which could affect short-term behaviour but also because
of their ability to learn, it will propagate the error to the
new decisions. Thus, the malicious attacker has the
opportunity for long-term impact on behaviour. Further-
more, CR collaborates with its fellow radios sharing
information. Consequently, this provides an opportunity
to propagate behaviour through the different networks.
Threats associated with each CRN features can be
detected [7], such as
• Maintains awareness of surrounding environment
and internal state. It could be an opportunity for spoof-
ing that will send malicious data to the environment to
provoke an erroneously perception.
• Adapts to its environment to meet requirements and
goals. It is an opportunity to force desired changes in
behaviour in the victim.
• Reasons on observations to adjust adaptation goals.
It could be an opportunity to influence fundamental
behaviour of CRN.
• Learns from previous experiences to recognize con-
ditions and enables faster reaction times. This could an
opportunity to affect long-lasting impact on CR
behaviour.
• Anticipates events in support of future decisions. It
could be an opportunity for long-lasting impact due to
an erroneous prediction.
• Collaborates with other devices to make decisions
based on collective observations and knowledge. This is
an opportunity to propagate an attack through network.
• Wireless communication. Data might be eaves-
dropped and altered without notice; and the channel
might be jammed and overused by adversary. Access
control, confidentiality, authentication and integrity
must be guaranteed.
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On the other hand, CRN features also help to mitigate
malicious manipulation using:
• The ability to collaborate for authentication of local
observations that are used to form perceived
environments.
• The ability to learn from previous attacks.
• The ability to anticipate behaviours to prevent
attacks.
• The ability to perform self-behaviour analysis.
Despite the extensive volume of research results on
WSN [8], the considerable amount of ongoing research
efforts on CR networks [9], and the new interest in
CWSN [10], security in CWSN is vastly unexplored
field. This is a new paradigm that offers many research
opportunities.
The organization of this article is as follows. In Section
2, works in security are reviewed. In Section 3, a new tax-
onomy of attacks is proposed. In Section 4, countermea-
sures for CWSN attacks are analysed. Challenges and
open works are shown in Section 5. Conclusions are
offered in Section 6.
2. Related work
First works about security in CR were developed specifi-
cally to analyse the effects produced by cognitive fea-
tures and how they could be used to mitigate the
negative effects. So, as we have said, in the article [7]
each characteristic and the attacks that could take
advantage of it are analysed. A different point of view is
shown in the article of Zhang and Li [11]. They make a
survey about the weaknesses introduced by the nature
of CR. They base the security of the system in two
tasks: protection and detection, and divide the attacks
and countermeasures depending on which layer of the
protocol stack affects. The article [12] studies threats
that affect the ability to learn of cognitive networks and
the dynamic spectrum access. To conclude the general
references about security, it should be noted the article
of Goergen and Clancy [9] where an attack classification
in cognitive networks is done: DSA attacks, objective
function attacks and malicious behaviour attacks.
In [13], two specific attacks against cognitive networks
are analysed: primary user emulation (PUE), and sensing
data falsification. It also provides some countermeasures
well adapted to static scenarios such as TV system. In
[14], a secure protocol spectrum sensing is presented. It
bases its functionality on the generation and transmission
of specific keys to each node. As a third example of safety
sensing investigation, the research [15] proposes a colla-
borative algorithm based on energy detection and
weighted combining (similar to a reputation system) to
prevent malicious users.
Related to specifics attacks, the most studied against
CR is the PUE, which was defined by Chen and Park
[16] for the first time in 2006. Since then, research of
the same authors [17] has focused on countermeasures
against PUE. Also, in [18] a way to detect the PUs
through an analytical model that does not require loca-
tion information is shown. As well as the PUE attack,
the community of researchers in CR has been studying
other kind of attacks originate from different wireless
networks, such as denial of service (DoS) attack or jam-
ming attack. These attacks have special characteristics in
cognitive networks, for example, article [19] studies
these features for DoS, and [20] shows a countermea-
sure based on frequency hopping (technically possible in
CR) to avoid jamming attacks.
Although previous articles help to understand the
importance of securing CRNs [21-23] they do not take
into account the specific characteristics of WSN.
On the other side, there are several articles related
with security in WSNs, a topic very studied [8,24-27],
but without using cognitive capabilities.
Summarizing the state of the art, there is still much to
investigate in the area of security for CWSNs, because
nowadays there is not any work focus on this topic.
3. Taxonomy of attacks in CWSNs
As we shown in Section 1, CWSNs have special features
that make security really interesting. However, security
in CWSNs needs to be more studied by scientific
community.
In this section, a complete taxonomy of attacks for
CWSNs is shown. We are going to compare the differ-
ences in the scope between these attacks in a traditional
WSN and in a cognitive one.
A taxonomy of attacks on CWSNs is very useful to
design optimistic security mechanisms. There are several
taxonomies of attacks on wireless networks [10] and focus
on WSNs [6]. Moreover, some classifications of attacks in
CR exist [3,9,11]. However, there is not a deep classifica-
tion of attacks in CWSNs and study of attacks against cog-
nitive WSNs does not exist.
We have analysed special network features that make
CWSNs better against attacks: high transmission range,
lower energy consumption, low delays and reliability of
data. Their security is obviously endangered by the med-
ium used, radio waves, but also by specific vulnerabilities of
CWSNs like battery life or low computational resources.
Considering theses features, we propose a taxonomy
which contains various attacks with different purposes,
behaviours and targets. This will help researchers to bet-
ter understand the principles of attacks in CWSNs, and
further design more optimistic countermeasures for sen-
sor networks. Figure 1 shows an outline of this CWSN
taxonomy of attacks. CWSN attacks are divided into
communications, against privacy, node-targeted, power
consumption, policy and cryptographic attacks.
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3.1. Communication attacks
First group is communication attacks. In this kind of
attacks the attacker affects data transmissions between
nodes with a concrete purpose. The goal could be from
isolate a node to try to change the behaviour of whole
network.
Communication attacks can be classified into three
different types according to the attack behaviour: replay
attack, DoS attack and Sybil attack. Replay attack [28]
consists on the replay of messages from inside or out-
side the current run of communication. For example,
message is directed to other than the intended node.
This receiver node replays the message to the intended
principal and this receives the delayed message. This
delay is fundamental to calculate network characteristics
(channel, topology, routing, etc.). CWSN could be
affected in more degree that a regular WSN because
nodes share information about the environment. If a
node receives wrong information and also repeated, net-
work behaviour could be affected deeply. If the PU
packets are repeated, SU could have a wrong perspective
of the spectrum too, avoiding the communications in
frequencies or protocols used by the attacker.
DoS attack is characterized by an explicit attempt to
present the legitimate use of a service. In this case, ser-
vices are the spectrum or a special node. Different kinds
of DoS attacks are
• Jamming attack, the transmission of a radio signal
that interferes with the radio frequencies used by nodes.
Jamming attack is one of the most studied attacks
against WSN [29]. However, CWSN has great advan-
tages to solve jamming but also can produce negative
effects like energy consumption or communication fail-
ures. A typical jamming attack is a high power transmis-
sion using the PU frequency.
• Collision attack [30] consist of the intention of vio-
late the communication protocol. This attack does not
consume much energy of the attacker but can cause a
lot of disruptions to the network operation. Due to the
wireless broadcast nature, it is not trivial to identify the
attacker. For example, the secondary users (SUs) have to
share the spectrum. Therefore, the use of this type of
attack is very efficient in order to disrupt the SU com-
munication. Nodes, detecting collisions, will relay the
information, making communication very difficult.
• Routing ill-directing attack. In this attack, a mali-
cious node simply refuses to route messages. Examples
of this kind of attacks are the grey hole and black hole
ones. In these attacks, the nodes refuse all packets that
arrive or a percentage thereof. Because of this misinfor-
mation, the network can change the routes, the topology
or leaving isolated nodes.
• In flooding attack, a malicious node sends many
connection request to a susceptible node, rendering the
node or the resource useless. For instance, a joint net-
work request to the coordinator node.
Sybil attack is defined as a malicious device illegiti-
mately taking multiple identities. Sybil attack is effective
against routing algorithms, voting, reputation systems
and foiling misbehaviour detection. For instance, Sybil
attack might utilize multiple identities to generate addi-
tional reputation to malicious nodes or to change the
sensing spectrum information. The most studied attack
against CR is the PUE.
3.2. Against privacy attacks
The other important attack class is attacks against priv-
acy. CWSNs allow sharing resources to establish a com-
munication and to be aware of environment. Attackers
could use this access to take some of node information.
Figure 1 Taxonomy of attacks.
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The attacks against node privacy include eavesdropping,
through taping the information; the attacker could easily
discover the communication contents. Impersonating
attack, where the attacker joins to the network and it
can impersonate the original victim sensor node to
receive packet, and traffic analysis, using wireless and
cognitive features to listen in the entire spectrum. Traf-
fic analysis attacks [31] try to deduce the context infor-
mation of nodes analysing the traffic pattern from
eavesdropping on wireless communication. Acquired
information could be used to prepare a most harmful
attack. For example, spectrum information can be used
to know what the weakest spectrum zone is or where
the PUs are emitting.
3.3. Node-targeted attacks
Node-targeted attacks need more attention that in a
normal WSN because of the propagation of information
is more important for the correct working of CWSN. A
node can be captured [32,33] and attackers use reverse-
engineered and become an instrument for mounting
counterattacks. Other possibility is to destroy the nodes.
This destruction not only affects to node functionality,
but also affects whole network. Usually, node-targeted
attacks ought to be less important for WSN. However,
distributed information and co-operational behaviour in
CWSN make a captured node a powerful weapon for
attackers. Extracting a cryptographic key and modifying
the internal device code are examples of node-targeted
attacks.
3.4. Power consumption attacks
Battery life in WSN is a crucial factor. Small size of
nodes and batteries makes CWSN very vulnerable to
power consumption attacks. The attacker can inflict
sleep torture on an energy constrained node by engaging
in it unnecessary communication work to quickly drain
its battery power. Depriving the power of a few crucial
nodes (e.g. Access Point) may lead communication
breakdown of the entire network. Attacker node can
request a channel change every time, increasing power
consumption.
3.5. Policy attacks
The security and privacy policies are imperative since
the policy basically influences the setup principles of a
CWSN. Policy attacks can be classified as:
• Excuse attack, if the network policy is overly gener-
ous to recovering nodes that recently crashed or
damaged by no requiring them to prove there are main-
taining their quota, a malicious node may exploit this
attack by repeatedly claiming to have been crashed/
damaged. In this way, for instance, wrong spectrum
information can be sent to the network very often to
change the communications.
• Newbie-picking attack, if a CWSN requires that new
nodes pay their dues by requiring them to give informa-
tion to the net for some period of the time before they
can consume any shared resource, therefore a veteran
node could move from one newbie node to another,
leeching their information without being required to
give any information back.
3.6. Cryptographic attacks
Concluding the taxonomy, the cryptographic attacks try
to find the weaknesses in system analysing the informa-
tion transmitted. Several cryptographic attacks exist but
their objectives are the same: to acquire the crypto-
graphic key, to identify weakness in the algorithms or in
the node software. CWSN nodes do not have enough
resources to implement a powerful cryptographic code
and they are vulnerable to these attacks.
Apart from the above listed attacks that may hinder
the key management of CWSNs, the following actions
will also danger the key management within CWSNs:
brute forces, dictionary attack and monitoring attack.
One example of this kind of attack is Differential Power
Analysis (DPA) attack. The DPA attack can be used to
target an unsuspecting victim either by using special
equipment that measures electromagnetic signals
emitted by chips inside the device or by attaching a sen-
sor to the device’s power supply.
4. Countermeasures in CWSN
According to Section 3 is very clear that CWSN face a
dangerous problem in security. Several attacks could be
adapted from WSN to the new paradigm of cognitive
networks. In the last 10 years, some researches related
with security on CRN have appeared. They related spe-
cific attacks against these networks but a few counter-
measures are proposed. In this section, we show three
different groups of countermeasures according to the
specific characteristics of CWSN.
4.1. Based on geolocation
CR has it’s origin in United States where an important
problem with the spectrum occupancy becomes real.
The main reason is that the access to the radio spec-
trum is ruled by a restrictive regulatory regime that
emerged when the Radio Act of 1927 declared the
“ether” to be a publicly owned resource. The goal of CR
was to use the radio spectrum when base stations did
not transmit.
According to that, first real and simulated scenarios
were static, with base stations making the role of PU
and different devices like SU. If an attacker tries to
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emulate a PU the geolocation is an efficient method
[18,34]. For example, in [34] the authors assume that
the attacker is close to the victim and the real PU is
much far from the SU and the attacker. Moreover, the
position of each node, including the attacker, is fixed.
Assuming that, SU can learn about the characteristics of
the spectrum according to the received power.
Geolocation countermeasure does not work for most
of cases in CWSN scenarios, almost with the same
approach that previous mentioned papers. In a regular
WSN, nodes can change their location, even attackers
can change it. In fact, attackers have in the movement a
great advantage to not be detected.
Another disadvantage of node mobility related to
security is that if we would like to monitor PU we need
to sense continuously the spectrum to detect new loca-
tions. The continuous sensing reduces node batteries.
Moreover, if the PU could be in any spatial point, its
location is irrelevant for security. For example, a mobile
phone with Wi-Fi could be a PU and this device could
stay in any location. Others parameters should be
observed to differentiate between PU and an attacker.
To conclude, if we want to use a countermeasure
based on geolocation, some restriction should be
defined. For example, restricted areas for attackers or
fixed number of PU in the scenario.
4.2. Based on behaviour
In the same way that geolocation countermeasures,
defences based on behaviour tries to modelling the PU
[35]. The model is used to look for differences between
a PU and attackers.
For example, in [17] authors use some radio para-
meters to decide if the transmitter is an incumbent
transmitter or an attacker. These parameters are: signal
characteristics, transmitted power and location. For a
typical TV scenario on CR the PU model could be very
precise. However as in geolocation countermeasures, the
previous studies do not work for CWSN. Unfortunately
it does not exist any model for PU in CWSN yet. PU
usually are more unpredictable that in previous
scenarios.
However, if we focus our CWSN in limited scenarios,
for example intelligence ambient in a home or a build-
ing, the PU is defined specifically. Parameters like power
transmission, time occupancy of spectrum and fre-
quency used could be detected.
Genetic or Self-Organizing Maps algorithms could be
used to detect the PUs behaviour and to difference
them against attackers. These algorithms can detect pat-
terns and behaviour changes, so they are a good solu-
tion for this problem. However, computational cost and
batteries life should be taking in account.
4.3. Based on reputation and trust of the CR nodes
Two different groups of countermeasures related with
the location and behaviour are proposed. Third group is
a complement for the previous solutions that could
improve the detection of attacks.
Reputation systems are very common in WSN [36].
Reputation takes advantage from the own characteristics
of WSN: redundancy and adaptation. Usually several
sensors form the networks and information is replied.
Redundancy can be used to detect and isolate faulty or
compromised nodes.
In CWSN where information is essential for the cog-
nitive behaviour and sharing information is almost com-
pulsory, reputation system can describe if the primary
and SUs act like we expect. The big amount of informa-
tion supplies the reputation system adjusting the reputa-
tion and trust of any node.
The best advantage of reputation systems is their ver-
satility. The countermeasures could be implemented in
any device, even small sensors with low resources, and
could be used, in combination with others attacks,
against most of attacks of Section 3.
5. Challenges and open problems
The nature of large, dynamic, adaptive, cognitive WSNs
presents significant challenges in designing security
schemes. A cognitive WSN is a special network which
has many constraints compared to a traditional wireless
network and many different features compared with a
traditional WSN. While security challenges have been
widely tackled in traditional networks, is a novel area in
CWSN. In this section, most important challenges are
discussed.
The wireless medium is inherently less secure because
its broadcast nature makes eavesdropping simple. Any
transmission can easily be intercepted, altered or
replayed by an adversary. The wireless medium allows
an attacker to easily intercept valid packets and easily
inject malicious ones. Cognitive features allow a
dynamic reconfiguration to avoid these attacks. How-
ever, malicious nodes can use the dynamic reconfigura-
tion to create new attacks such us PUE. CWSNs have to
adapt traditional wireless problems to cognitive net-
works and provide solutions to new problems.
The dynamic nature of sensor networks means no struc-
ture can be statically defined. Cognitive approach includes
new dynamic issues: communication protocol, modula-
tion, frequency, sensibility or emitted power. The attacker
can use these powerful characteristics to affect the data
transmissions between nodes with a concrete purpose.
The goal could be from isolate a node to try to change the
behaviour of entire network. Security schemes must be
able to operate within this dynamic environment.
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The next challenging factor is the hostile environment
in which cognitive sensor nodes function. Nodes face
the possibility of destruction or capture by attackers.
Since nodes may be in a hostile environment, attackers
can easily gain physical access to the devices. Attackers
may capture a node, physically disassemble it, and
extract from it valuable information (e.g. cryptographic
keys). Because of the capacity of change the communi-
cation protocol, a capture node can affect to the whole
network. For example, a malicious node can order to
the network use a specific modulation or cryptographic
algorithm and capture all the data. Also node can pro-
vide wrong information to the network causing a bad
configuration. The ability to have a profound effect on
network performance and behaviour through simple
spectral manipulation is very dangerous. The highly hos-
tile environment represents a serious challenge for
security researchers.
The extreme resource limitations of CWSN devices
pose considerable challenges to resource-hungry security
mechanisms. The hardware constraints necessitate
extremely efficient security algorithms in terms of band-
width, computational complexity and memory. This is
no trivial task. Energy is the most precious resource for
these networks. Communication and cognitive algo-
rithms are especially expensive in terms of power. Cog-
nitive networks usually reduce power emission to save
batteries. Attacker can isolate a node easily. Clearly,
security mechanisms must give special effort to be com-
munication efficient in order to be energy efficient.
The proposed scale of cognitive WSNs poses a signifi-
cant challenge for security mechanisms. Cognitive net-
works are not only hundreds of sensors; they can also
include different wireless interfaces and integrate a myr-
iad of nodes in the same network. Providing security
over such a network is equally challenging. Security
mechanisms must be scalable to very large networks
with different radio interfaces while maintaining high
computation and communication efficiency.
One of the main goals of CWSNs is to allow a reliable
communication. Certainly, unreliable communication is
another threat to nodes security. The security of the
network relies heavily on a defined protocol, which in
turn depends on communication. Even if the channel is
reliable, the communication may still be unreliable. The
multi-hop routing, network congestion and node proces-
sing can lead to greater latency in the network, thus
making it difficult to achieve synchronization among
sensor nodes to change the communication scheme.
Depending on the function of the particular sensor
network, the sensor nodes may be left unattended for
long periods of time. There are two main cautions to
unattended sensor nodes: exposure to physical attacks
and managed remotely. Remote management of a sensor
network makes it virtually impossible to detect physical
tampering or DPA attack. Perhaps most importantly, the
longer that a sensor is left unattended the more likely
that an adversary has compromised the node.
CWSNs have a special feature for security mechanism:
dynamic reconfiguration network scheme. Level security
can adapts to a specific application, network topology,
power and other constraints. Security level reconfigura-
tion biased by different constraints has to be considered
in order to improve network security.
6. Conclusions
CWSNs are increasingly being used in military, environ-
mental, health and commercial applications. These net-
works are inherently different from traditional wireless
networks as well as WSNs. Security is a mandatory fea-
ture for the deployment of CWSNs. This article sum-
marizes the attacks and their taxonomy and also an
attempt has been made to explore the security mechan-
isms widely used to handle those attacks. The challenges
of WSNs are also briefly discussed. Security issues are a
novel research area. This survey will hopefully motivate
future researchers to design smarter and more robust
security mechanisms and make their networks safer.
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